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The Issuing Bank's Defences Against the Payee of a Bank Draft -
Addendum to "The Autonomy of the Banker's Obligation on Bank Drafts
and Certified Cheques"*
Benjamin Geva**
Ricky Yan v . Post Office Bank,' a recent decision of the New Zealand Court of
Appeal, allowed a bonafide for value payee of a bank draft to recover from the
issuingbank notwithstanding the latter's defences against theremitter (namely the
bank customerwho procuredtheissueofthebank draft) . The decision came tomy
attention too late to be referred to in the above-captioned article. Nonetheless, it
merits attention . The ensuing discussion will critically examine the reasoning of
thejudgment . I will argue thatthe Court gave wrong reasons for the right result2
Contrary to the analysis ofPart I ofthe above-captioned article, and having
onlybriefly discussed the issue, the Courtheld that a payee of abank draftcould
not be a holder in due course . Specifically citing R.E. Jones Ltd. v . Waring and
GillowLtd.,' the Court concluded thatthe instrument had not been "negotiated"
to the payee, thereby disqualifying him from becoming a holder in due course,
notwithstanding his compliancewiththe other statutoryrequirements, including
taking theinstrumentin goodfaith, withoutnotice andfor value . Acknowledging
that by giving the remitter valuable consideration forthe instrument, the payee
satisfied the holder for value statutory requirements,' the Court nevertheless
correctly concluded that"a holderfor value hasno special rightsunless heis also
a holder in due course, and [the payee] does not come within that category" .
Ultimately, however,thepayee won byvirtue ofthedismissal oftheissuing bank's
defenceoffailureofconsideration as wellasonthebasis ofcommon law estoppel .
Asforthefailure ofconsideration, theCourt highlightedthe distinctiveness
ofthe contractbetweenthe issuingbankand theremitterfromtheissuing bank's
engagement to the payee. This, however, overlooks the derivative title of the
payee to the instrument . The bank draft is not a letter of credit generating a
* (1994) 73 Can . Bar Rev. 21 .
** Professor of Law, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario .
' [199411 N.Z.L.R. 154 (C.A.) . See R . Edwards, "New Zealand Lesson on Bank
Cheques . . ." (1994) J.B.F.L.P. 39 .
2 In fact, in the facts of the case, even the result may not be right, inasmuch as the
instrument was crossed and marked "not negotiable" . No such practice is prevalent in
Canada and this aspect ofthe case will not be further considered . See p . 28 ofthe above-
captioned article .
3 [1926] A.C . 670 (H.L.) .
' Particularly, under the corresponding provisions to ss . 52(1) and 53(1) of the
Canadian Bills ofExchangeAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4 (ss . 27(1) and (2) oftheEnglish Act,
45 & 46 Vict., c. 61 as am.) under which "[v]aluable consideration for [an instrument] may
be constituted by . . . any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract ; or. . . an
antecedent debt or liability", and "[w]here value has, at any time, been given for [an
instrument], the holder is deemed to be a holder for value as regards . . . all parties to the
[instrument] whobecameparties prior tothat time" . The latter is referred to below as "the
holder for value provision".
1994]
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separate engagement to the beneficiary; at the inception of the bank draft, the
issuing bankwasliablethereonto theremitter, andit is theremitter'srightwhich
was transferred to the payee. The Court thus failed to explain how the payee,
whotakes the instrument from its original owner, theremitter, holds it free from
defences available to the issuing bank against that predecessor in title .'
Moreover, inasmuch as it purportedto base the payee's elevated status onthe
value given by the payee to the remitter, the Court relied on the "holderfor value"
provision,' deemingaholder tobe a holder forvalueonthe basis ofany valuegiven
for the instrument. This, however, was the very section which had not been
considered by the Court to be adequate to protect the payee-holder!' Indeed, in
relying on the "holder for value" provision, the Court specifically citedDiamond
v. Graham,' ajudgment oftheEnglishCourtofAppeal . In thatcase, Grahammade
out achequepayable to Diamondand deliveredit to Herman forconsiderationthat
subsequently failed . Herman delivered the cheque to Diamond for good
consideration.9 As against Diamond, Graham purported to dishonourthe cheque
(drawn by him to Diamond's order) on the basis of the failure of Herman's
consideration on the contract under which the cheque had been delivered by
Graham to Herman. Finding that the case "turns upon the construction of [the
`holder for value' provision]"" aunanimous Court ofAppeal" heldthatDiamond
"clearly . . . falls within allrequirements of the section""' and decided in his favour.
Elsewhere," I argued that the "holder for value" provision was totally
irrelevant in resolving Diamond v. Graham . In fact, payee Diamond should
haveprevailed as aholderindue course. Indeed, it is overwhelmingly accepted
that by merely giving value, or taking an instrument for which value has been
given, aholderfor value does nothave an indefeasible-right on the instrument . "4
As indicated elsewhere," I maintain that by stating that "[w]here value.has, at
any time, been givenfor [an instrument], the holder is deemed to be a holder for
value. . . . . .the"holderforvalue"provision"means onlythatabsenceforconsideration.
5 Forthe remitter's original title and the payee's derivative title, see particularly, pp .
30-31 ofthe above-captioned article . The issuing bank and the payee ofa bank draft are
remote and notimmediate parties .
6 See supra footnote 4.
' See text supra footnote 4.
8 [196811W.L.R. 1061 .
9 The consideration from Herman to Graham (that failed) was a cheque payable by
Herman to Graham. Likewise, the consideration from Diamond to Herman (that did not
fail) was Diamond's cheque payable to Herman .
'° Supra footnote 8 at 1064 per Diplock L.J.
"" Danckwerts, Diplock, and Sachs LJJ.
"z Supra footnote 8 at 1065 per Diplock L.J.
13 B . Geva, Financing Consumer Sales and Product Defences in Canada and the
United States (Toronto : Carswell, 1984) at 150-151, and earlier in B. Geva, "Absence of
Consideration in the Law of Bills and Notes" [1980] Cambridge L.J. 360.
14 Megrah,letter to the editors, reproduceinNote, "Diamondv. Graham,theDoctrine
ofConsideration and Value for a cheque" (1969) 15 McGill L.J . 487 at 492.
15 See supra footnote 13 at 140-151 (particularly 148-149). -
11 Supra footnote 3.
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isnot an equity as to ownership ; that is, one who acquired aninstrumentby wayof
agift, withoutgivingvalue,mayrecoverfrompriorparties liable onthe instrument,
though subject to their defences . I further argued" that the confusing distinction
between a "mere holder" and a "holder for value" ought to be simply understood
to say that an instrument for which no value has been given by anyone is
unenforceable. Obviously, it does not follow that by giving value, never mind by
sheltering under a predecessor who gave value, a holder becomes entitled to
enforce an instrument free of defences ofparties liable thereon .
I should add that under both the German Civil Code and the Swiss Code of
Obligations, the acceptance of an order to pay generates an independent and
separate undertaking of the acceptor to the payee, unrelated to and free from
defences arising fromthe contractual relationship between thegiver ofthe order
andthedrawee/acceptor.'$ This maybe quite similar to the reasoning ofthe New
Zealand CourtofAppeal. Nonetheless, the common law does not contain such
a rule, at least as a matter of first impression ; without the benefit of a further
extensive analysis, not undertaken in RickyYanv. Post Office Bank, one cannot
assume that such a rule is well founded as a matter of common law .
Alternatively, the New Zealand Court of Appealrationalized its decision in
the payee's favour on the basis of common law estoppel :
"[The issuing bank] must be taken to be aware of the fact that bank [drafts] are
commonly reliedupon in commercial transactions as beingalmostequivalentto cash,
and that the purpose ofobtaining a bank [draft], rather than the customer proffering
his own cheque, is to enable the payee to have the added assurance ofpayment . This
would be futile if the bank's [draft] were to be no better than the customer's cheque
against which it was issued" .
This reasoning is subject to two major flaws . First, it purports to recognize a
commercial custom or usage merely on the basis of judicial notice and without
evidence. Second, compared to the personalcheque, the obligation ofthe issuing
bankis undoubtedly an addedfeature ofthe bankdraft;'9 whethersuch anobligation
is absolute and free of defences may be an entirely different question .
In the final analysis, the bank draft is a negotiable instrument governed by
the Bills ofExchange ACt.2° Certainty and consistency are enhanced where the
defence-free position of the payee is determined within the framework ofthis
piece of legislation, as a matter of a correct application of principles oflaw and
statutory interpretation. If only for this reason, the defence-free position of the
payee ofa bank draft ought better be explained on the basis ofthe holder in due
course doctrine, as set out in Part I ofthe above-captioned article, rather than as
held in Ricky Yan v. Post Office Bank.
" B. Geva, BookReview ofChambers and Gueston Bills ofExchange, Cheques and
Promissory Notes, 141hed.-(1993) 8 B.F.L.R . 281 at 285-86.
's See BGB §784 (Germany), and CO art . 468 (Switzerland) .
'9 For the binding commitment of the issuing bank, see B . Geva, "Irrevocability of
Bank Drafts, Certified Cheques and Money Orders" (1986) 65 Can. Bar Rev . 107 .
1 Supra footnote 4.
